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FACTS OF INTEREST  
CONCERNING THE MILITARY  
RESOURCES AND POLICY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES



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TO THE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

*J. J.*

UNIV. OF  
CALIFORNIA

FOREWORD.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Washington, January 20, 1914.*

Considerable interest has been shown in the subjects of military instruction in colleges, military reserves, methods of enlistment, and the exact nature of the measures either now in force or contemplated to safeguard the Nation.

This interest is indicated by many letters, particularly from college presidents, editors, etc., requesting a brief statement of the latest official and reliable data on the above subjects.

Believing the information would be of value to all thinking persons interested in the continued peace and welfare of our country, the following is sent out for use, if desired, as a ready reference on the subjects treated.

LEONARD WOOD,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

70 yard  
approach

# THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

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*Commander in Chief,*

WOODROW WILSON, PRESIDENT.

*Secretary of War,*

LINDLEY M. GARRISON.

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ACT OF APRIL 22, 1898. 30 STAT. L., 361.

"All able-bodied male citizens of the United States and persons of foreign birth who have declared their intention to become citizens \* \* \* between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and with such exceptions and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law, shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States."

"The organized and active land forces of the United States shall consist of the Army of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the service of the United States."

"The Regular Army is the permanent military establishment which is maintained both in peace and war, according to law."

## ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

The Regular Army now has an authorized strength of approximately 84,000 men and 4,746 officers. This should not be confused with the fighting strength, which is necessarily much less, as will be shown later. Neither should it be assumed that this is the actual strength, for nearly all organizations have more or less vacancies at all times.

The primary classification of the Army is as follows:

1. The mobile army, or that which should be capable of moving any place on land for attack or defense, and should be organized into properly proportioned, well-trained, and cohesive brigades and divisions.

2. The Coast Artillery, which mans the guns of our coast defenses.



## THE MOBILE ARMY.

The great bulk of such an army is infantry. These are the men whose means of transportation are their own feet, and who carry their own weapons, ammunition, shelter, and food, and who, on the march and in combat, bear the heaviest burdens and losses. Beginning with the higher units, the Infantry is organized into *brigades* of three regiments each. The brigade is commanded by a brigadier general. The regiment, commanded by a colonel, is made up of three battalions. Each *battalion*, under command of a major, consists of four companies. The *company* is the command of a captain, who is assisted by two lieutenants; it is the smallest administrative unit, but for purposes of training and combat is divided into platoons and squads under the lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals. As a part of each regiment there is a band, a machine-gun platoon having two automatic guns, and some mounted scouts.

Intimately associated with the Infantry as a fighting arm is the FIELD ARTILLERY. This arm has as a weapon the large-caliber, long-range guns, so essential as a support to the Infantry in combat. The largest unit we have at present is the *regiment*, commanded by a colonel. The regiment consists of two *battalions*, each under a major. The battalion is made up of three *batteries*, each being commanded by a captain, who is assisted by four lieutenants. Each battery has four *guns* and twelve caissons.

We have artillery of different kinds, according to the nature of the work expected of it. In the *horse artillery* the members of the battery are mounted in order that they may accompany cavalry. In the *mountain artillery* the guns are of a type that may be dismounted and, with the ammunition, carried on pack mules.

The other important element of our fighting team is the CAVALRY. In this branch the weapons and organization are much the same as in the Infantry, but the men are mounted. In the Cavalry the three subdivisions of the regiment are known as *squadrons*, and instead of companies we have *troops*.

In addition to the three arms already mentioned many other auxiliary troops are necessary to make a complete fighting force, but their numbers are very much less than the three arms mentioned. The ENGINEERS must make and repair roads and bridges, construct and demolish fortifications, and perform other important work. Our present force of these troops is three *battalions* of four *companies* each. The SIGNAL CORPS operates all the means of signaling and communication from the flag to the aeroplane. The highest unit at present is the *company*, which is organized and equipped according to the duties expected of it. The MEDICAL DEPARTMENT are known as sanitary troops, and may either be assigned to special

units, as regiments, etc., or be formed into *ambulance companies* or *field hospitals*. The QUARTERMASTER CORPS furnishes the transportation, rations, and shelter, and has charge of the payment of troops. The men of the corps are clerks, bakers, teamsters, etc. There are also other staff departments, consisting of officers only, who have charge of various matters pertaining to the administration. All of these have duties to perform in connection with other parts of our forces, as well as with the mobile army.

#### THE COAST ARTILLERY.

This branch has charge of our seacoast defenses, and about all of their available time is taken up in training them in their highly technical duties. They are in addition armed as infantry, and some attempt is made to give them a little infantry training, but they are intended, primarily, for coast defense and can not properly be considered a part of our mobile army.

The Coast Artillery is organized into companies, of which we have 170, with an authorized strength of 104 men each, the total authorized strength of this arm being 18,931.

## MILITARY POLICY.

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### 1. THE TRADITIONAL MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

The problem of military organization has two aspects, a dynamic aspect and a political aspect. The measure of military force required to meet any given emergency is purely dynamic, while the form of military institutions must be determined on political grounds, with due regard to national genius and tradition. There can be no sound solution of the problem if either of these fundamental aspects be ignored. The military pedant may fail by proposing adequate and economical forces under forms that are intolerable to the national genius, while the political pedant may propose military systems which lack nothing except the necessary element of trained and disciplined military force. The practical military statesman must recognize both of these elements of the problem. He does not propose impracticable or foreign institutions, but seeks to develop the necessary vigor and energy within the familiar institutions that have grown with the national life. But the ultimate test is dynamic. In any military system the final test is capacity to exert superior military force in time to meet any given national emergency.

It is the traditional policy of the United States that the Military Establishment in time of peace is to be a small regular army and that the ultimate war force of the Nation is to be a great army of citizen soldiers. This fundamental theory of military organization is sound economically and politically. The maintenance of armies in time of peace imposes a heavy financial burden on the Nation, and the expenditure for this purpose should be kept at a minimum consistent with effectiveness for war. But reliance upon citizen soldiers is subject to the limitation that they can not be expected to meet a trained enemy until they, too, have been trained. Our history is full of the success of the volunteer soldier after he has been trained for war, but it contains no record of the successful employment of raw levies for general military purposes.

It is therefore our most important military problem to devise means for preparing great armies of citizen soldiers to meet the emergency of modern war. The organization of the Regular Army is but a smaller phase of this problem. It is simply the peace nucleus of the greater war army, and its strength and organization should always be considered with reference to its relation to the greater war force which

can not be placed in the field until war is imminent. The problem is one of expansion from a small peace force to a great war force. Its solution therefore involves the provision of a sufficient peace nucleus, the partial organization and training of citizen soldiers in peace, and provisions for prompt and orderly expansion on the outbreak of war.

But the practical solution of the problem can not be met by the promulgation of a general theory. The Army at any time and place must be strong enough to defeat any enemy that may oppose it at that time and place. We are concerned more with the time required to raise the force of trained troops than with their ultimate numbers. If we need 60,000 soldiers in a given terrain within 30 days and can only deploy 50,000 soldiers in that time and place, we are not prepared for the emergency even if our plans provide for ten times that number at some period in the future. Whatever our military institutions may be, we must recognize the fundamental facts that victory is the reward of superior force, that modern wars are short and decisive, and that trained armies alone can defeat trained armies.

## 2. THE TIME REQUIRED TO RAISE ARMIES.

The time required for the training of extemporized armies depends largely on the presence or absence of trained instructors. If there be a corps of trained officers and noncommissioned officers and a tested organization of higher units with trained leaders and staff officers, the problem of training is limited to the training of the private soldier. This can be accomplished in a relatively short time, and under such conditions if arms and equipment are available a respectable army can be formed within six months. But where the leaders themselves are untrained and where officers and men must alike stumble toward efficiency without intelligent guidance, the formation of an efficient army is a question of years. Indeed such a force can not become an army at all within the period of duration of modern war. As the American war of 1861-1865 presents the singular phenomenon of two extemporized armies gradually developing while in conflict with each other, it is a most remarkable record of the evolution of such forces. In the conflicts of 1861 both officers and men were untrained for the duties demanded of them. Even the companies were imperfectly organized as units of the regiment, and the lack of cohesion was still more apparent in the higher units. Bull Run disorganized both armies. One was demoralized by defeat and the other by victory. By 1862 effective regiments, brigades, and divisions had come into being, but the conduct and leading of higher units as a rule was still imperfect. It was not until 1863 that the armies confronted each other as complete and effective military teams. But even in the early stages of the war the influence of trained and able leaders was

apparent. The time required to make an effective soldier depends very largely on the organization in which the recruit is enrolled. The recruit of 1861 could not become a good private until his captain became a good captain, but the recruit of 1863 was absorbed in a team already trained, and therefore became a trained soldier in a few months of active service. But while the history of the Civil War is instructive as a record of military evolution it can not be invoked as a guide of military policy, for we can count upon it that in our career as a world power no serious competitor will ever oppose us with extemporized armies.

In view of these considerations it is obvious that the citizen soldier must have some training in peace if he is to be effective in the sudden crisis of modern war. The organization in which he is to serve must exist and function in time of peace, and in view of the limited time available for training it should be a fundamental principle of American policy that no officer should be intrusted with the leadership of American soldiers who has not prepared himself for that responsibility in time of peace. The American soldier, whether regular or volunteer, is entitled to trained leadership in war.

It will never be possible for citizen soldiers to acquire thorough military training and experience in time of peace. Their training and hardening must be completed after mobilization, but the period required for such final training will be reduced exactly in proportion to the amount of training already received in time of peace. If the total peace training of a National Guard company is equivalent to two months in the field, it will be available for duty at the front two months earlier than a company of raw men, assuming other conditions equal in each case; but in any event during the period of final training, which will vary for different companies and regiments, the Regular Army must meet the situation at the front. If our citizen soldiery is put on a proper basis as to organization and training—a basis on which it does not now rest—its regiments will soon reenforce the line. Even with their limited peace training they will soon be effective for defense, and after a short period of field practice the best-officered organizations will begin to expand the Army for general military purposes.

### 3. TWO CLASSES OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY, ORGANIZED AND UNORGANIZED.

The traditional army of citizen soldiery should be considered as divided into two distinct classes, as follows:

1. The organized citizen soldiery, comprising those who are enrolled in definite military organizations and are partially trained in peace. This force is now known as the National Guard and is organized under the militia clause of the Constitution.

2. The unorganized citizen soldiery: Included in this class is the Reserve Militia, which is made up of all the able-bodied citizens liable for militia duty, but who are not enrolled as members of the National Guard.

In the past the citizens liable for military duty have served the Federal Government under three distinct conditions: First, by being enrolled into a militia regiment which had been or was to be mustered into the service of the United States; second, by being enrolled into a State volunteer regiment; third, by being enrolled into a United States volunteer regiment.

As the trained armies of modern nations will seek a decision in the early stages of war, and as extemporized armies will rarely be fit for use within the brief duration of such a conflict, it is obvious that our military policy should aim at increasing the peace strength and efficiency of the organized citizen soldiery. Provisions should be made for the organization of such new volunteer units as may be necessary on the outbreak of war, but it should always be the goal of sound policy to form the proper units in peace so that the war contingent of raw recruits can be absorbed into trained teams already in existence: This policy must be based upon the principle that a nation's military power is to be measured not by the total number of its male citizens capable of bearing arms but by the number of trained soldiers with which it can meet a given emergency.

#### 4. RELATION OF THE REGULAR ARMY TO THE NATION'S WAR POWER.

From a general consideration of our institutions and the requirements of modern war it thus appears that the Regular Army is simply the peace nucleus of the greater war Army of the Nation. Its strength and organization should therefore be determined by its relation to the larger force. It must form a definite model for the organization and expansion of the great war Army, and it must also be prepared to meet sudden and special emergencies which can not be met by the army of citizen soldiery. Some of the special functions of the Regular Army are indicated below:

1. The peace garrisons of the foreign possessions of the United States must be detachments of the Regular Army.

2. The peace garrisons of our fortified harbors and naval bases with a sufficient nucleus of the mobile army elements of coast defense must be regular troops, definitely organized in time of peace.

3. The peace establishment of the Regular Army must be sufficient to prevent naval raids, which under modern conditions may precede a declaration of war. A successful raid of this character may determine the initiative by giving the enemy a convenient base for future operations.

4. The Regular Army must form a mobile reserve prepared to re-enforce the foreign garrisons during periods of insurrection and disorder.

5. The Regular Army must be prepared to furnish expeditionary forces for minor wars or for the occupation of foreign territory where treaty rights or fundamental national policies are threatened.

6. The Regular Army must be prepared to cooperate with the Navy in the formation of joint expeditions in support of the foreign interests of the United States and for the protection of American citizens abroad.

7. At the outbreak of war regular forces should be concentrated and ready to seize opportunities for important initial successes. Such opportunities will frequently be offered before the mobilization of the army of citizen soldiers can be completed.

8. At the outbreak of war special regular detachments should be ready to seize important strategic positions before they can be occupied or adequately defended by the enemy and before the concentration of the army of citizen soldiers is complete. Initial operations of this kind, such as seizing the crossings of a river frontier or a port of embarkation, frequently determine the future conduct of war and assure an early decision. Capacity to take the initiative with an effective force is the best preventive of war.

9. By its definite organization in peace the Regular Army becomes the nucleus of the greater war Army. By its peace practice, its varied experience on foreign service, and its participation in expeditions the Regular Army becomes the experimental model of the Volunteer Army. It solves practical problems of equipment, armament, and supply, and makes its technical experience in these matters available for the larger force which is normally absorbed in peaceful occupations. It makes our war problem one of definite and orderly expansion instead of the vastly more difficult problem of extemporization.

10. The Regular Army will furnish a school of military theory and practice and will develop officers with special equipment and training for the higher staff duties in war.

11. Through its professional schools and General Staff the Regular Army will develop the unified military doctrine and policy which must permeate the entire National Army if it is to succeed in war.

12. Through its administrative and supply departments the Regular Army in peace will prepare in advance for the equipment, transportation, and supply of the great war Army of the Nation.

## THE JOINT USE OF REGULARS AND CITIZEN SOLDIERY.

In the defense of Great Britain regular divisions<sup>1</sup> and territorial divisions will be combined in field armies for joint action. Any group of two or more divisions will form a field army. This permits the two forces to cooperate fully in the national defense and yet bases the ultimate grouping of the divisions on the undoubted differences of function of the two forces. This is pointed out because a different theory of organization has been proposed in this country, based on the idea of mixing regular troops and citizen soldiery in the same divisions. It has been proposed to form divisions comprising two brigades of regulars and one brigade of citizen soldiers or one brigade of regulars and two brigades of citizen soldiers, with various other combinations of these two classes of troops. A slight consideration will show the fundamental defects of this system.

In the first place, regular troops may and frequently will be dispatched on special missions before the citizen soldiery is called out. If the normal division organization includes both classes of forces, every time the regular troops are detached to perform their special functions one or more of the divisions of the normal organization will be disrupted. Again, while trained volunteers will be fully effective in war, it can not be disputed that at the outbreak of war regular troops will have more training, greater endurance, and therefore higher maneuvering velocity. But a division is a fundamental army unit. If the regulars are formed in separate divisions, we will have a small force with the endurance and velocity necessary for the sudden strategic enterprises which determine the initiative in war. These divisions can move at once and may even be put in a favorable initial position for striking a blow at the very outbreak of war. They can be quietly concentrated in many cases before diplomatic and political conditions justify the calling out the National Guard or volunteers. But if these forces are the component parts of mixed divisions they can not move as divisions at all, until the citizen

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<sup>1</sup> The *division* is the fundamental army unit in which the several arms are combined for joint action in the field. It is essentially a small army complete in itself and capable of independent action. Larger forces, such as field armies, are simply aggregations of two or more divisions, with such additional auxiliaries as may be required for the particular terrain and mission.

The details of division organization are different in different countries, but the essential idea is that a division is a force of infantry provided with a proper proportion of field artillery and cavalry and supported by certain special units which are concerned with the special problems of field engineering, communication, transportation, supply, and sanitation. In the United States it is composed as follows:

Division headquarters.

3 Infantry brigades of 3 regiments each.

1 regiment of Cavalry.

1 brigade of Field Artillery (2 regiments).

1 pioneer battalion of Engineers.

1 field battalion of Signal troops.

Sanitary troops organized into 4 field hospitals and 4 ambulance companies.

1 ammunition column.

1 supply train.

1 pack train.



soldier contingents of the divisions are embodied, and when they do move, the velocity and endurance of the mixed divisions will be determined by the condition of their newly mobilized elements. Under such an organization it will be impossible to utilize the special qualities of the highly trained nucleus, except at the expense of disrupting the normal organization at the very outbreak of war.

It is presumed that the main reason for suggesting the placing of regiments of citizen soldiery in brigades with regular regiments, or the placing of citizen soldier brigades in divisions with regular brigades, is to give raw troops the example of trained troops on the march and in battle. This will undoubtedly be an advantage in special cases, but it should not be made the basis of permanent organization. It should be our policy to develop our citizen soldiers in peace, so that they will no longer be raw troops when they meet the enemy. But the acceptance of this policy will not preclude the adoption of special measures to meet special occasions where raw troops must be employed to the best advantage. Even on the defensive, where untrained troops have always shown to the best advantage, it would seem that regular troops should not be completely dispersed in the trenches, but should be used as a reserve to repulse the main attack or to make an offensive counterstroke if an opportunity offers. Jackson's troops at New Orleans were able to hold an entrenched position with protected flanks, but he had no troops with sufficient organization or training to complete the victory by a vigorous pursuit of the defeated enemy.

We may therefore accept the following general principles as the basis of correct organization of our mobile forces:

1. The mobile elements of the Regular Army should have a divisional organization in time of peace. This requires that it be organized in tactical divisions, even if these divisions be incomplete and insufficient in number. Even a small army should be correctly organized as an army.

2. Every effort should be made to give a divisional organization to the organized citizen soldiery in time of peace. If our citizen soldiers ever go to war, they must be organized into divisions before they can be employed effectively against the enemy. In order to employ them promptly, every possible detail of this organization should be settled in time of peace.

Whenever it becomes necessary to reenforce the Regular Army and the National Guard by volunteer organizations, it is important that they should be prepared for effective service in the minimum of time. This requires that they be formed by trained officers acting under prearranged plans. It is believed that this can best be accomplished by forming the new organizations as United States Volunteers under a national volunteer law.

So long as our National Guard is organized under the militia clause of the Constitution it will be impracticable to provide Federal division commanders in time of peace. But under the power to organize and inspect the militia it would seem feasible to organize definite districts, to encourage the formation of the necessary units, and to give each division an inspection staff, through which the war preparation can be kept up in peace.

Each division district should contain a complete division and all of the plans for its mobilization, supply,<sup>1</sup> and concentration should be prepared in peace and continually corrected to date. This can only be accomplished by assigning trained officers to arrange the details of organization under the supervision of the General Staff, which is intrusted by law with plans for war. Under present conditions it would be necessary to organize the fundamental war units after mobilization. The War College can and has prepared plans for such mobilization, but in the absence of a definite policy embodied in the law there is no assurance that such plans can be carried into effect. Solid and stable arrangements for mobilization can not be based on a hypothetical policy. Until there is a legalized system our actual mobilization will depend upon political conditions at the time of the crisis. Gaps in our legislation will be filled in haste and no human agency will be able to predict what the law will be. Our traditional theory of a small Regular Army and a great war army of citizen soldiers is not yet embodied as a definite institution. The mobilization of our citizen soldiery to-day would not result in a well-knit national army. It would be an uncoordinated army of 50 allies, with all of the inherent weaknesses of allied forces, emphasized by the unusual number of the allies.

#### REFERENCE BOOKS.

1. The Military Policy of the United States. Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, United States Army. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
2. Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, General Staff Report. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
3. Report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

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<sup>1</sup> The supply-depot system should be extended so that the material and equipment necessary to equip any organization to war strength would be centrally stored within the division district. Requisitions should be filled from these depots and the stores issued replaced, so that a minimum of deterioration would result. The ideal condition would be to have this additional war equipment actually in the hands of organizations, but this can not be accomplished generally with the National Guard until adequate storage facilities have been supplied.

## THE NECESSITY OF A RESERVE SYSTEM.

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### 1. MAINTENANCE OF STRENGTH IN WAR.

An army is an expensive machine maintained in order to support national interests in time of emergency. The economic efficiency of an army should therefore be measured by the effective fighting power which it is proposed to develop and maintain in war. It must not only be able to develop a high fighting efficiency at the outbreak of war, but it must be able to maintain that efficiency during the progress of the campaign. As soon as war begins military forces are subject to heavy losses, and unless means are definitely provided for replacing these losses the military machine will immediately deteriorate. The losses in war are not only the losses in battle, but losses due to disease and losses due to the hardship of campaign. The Prussian Guard Corps in its marches to Sedan lost 5,000 men on the march alone. It was necessary for the corps to arrive at the battle field in time, and that required a velocity of march that was more destructive than battle. It should be remembered that the soldiers in this force were trained soldiers and that the guard corps arrived and fought at Sedan in spite of its march losses. A force of soft or raw troops could not have arrived at all. Careful training is necessary to prepare troops for war; but it must be recognized that wastage will occur and that if a really effective force is to be maintained trained men must be supplied to replace this wastage.

It is the experience of modern warfare that any given unit loses at least 50 per cent of its strength in the first six months of war. If this loss is not replaced, there is 50 per cent deterioration in the power of the unit; and if it is replaced by raw men the quality of the force as a highly trained team is destroyed.

This problem has an important economic aspect that has been ignored throughout our military history. Military forces are maintained at great expense through long periods of peace in order to meet a brief emergency in war. Sound economics, therefore, demands that the peace expenditure be justified by unquestioned war efficiency. A company of infantry with three officers should contain the maximum number of trained riflemen that three capable officers can command. This maximum appears to be about 150 men; but if the company starts in the campaign with 150 men the natural wastage

of war will immediately reduce it below that number. If the vacancies are not filled, it ceases to be an economical company, because under these conditions we have a less number of men than three trained officers should control; and, on the other hand, if the vacancies are filled by untrained men, the company ceases to be a trained team, as under these conditions the three officers can not effectively command 150 men in action.

The United States is the only Nation that has no scientific means of meeting this situation. In all of our wars the companies first sent into the field have dwindled away in strength, and as these units have dwindled away new levies under untrained officers have been organized. The result has been that our wars have been long and protracted and attended by great sacrifices of blood and treasure. Each battle has generally been followed by a period of inactivity. Such an army has no power to keep up persistent military activity.

Without some solution of this problem there can be no definite military organization. The organization of divisions and other higher military units is based on the principle that the three arms should be combined in definite proportions. The infantry division is differently organized in different countries, but in all countries it consists of from 10,000 to 15,000 infantrymen, with from 4 to 6 field guns per thousand rifles, and with similar definite proportions of cavalry, engineers, signal troops, and other auxiliaries. The infantry strength is the basis of organization. In every army except our own the number of infantrymen is definite and fixed, because means of replacing losses are provided in time of peace. With us, however, the infantry strength is an absolute variable. We can only predict that the effective strength of each unit will fall after war begins. Under these conditions the division is not a continuing unit. Its components are fluid and indefinite, and there can be no stable organization under such conditions.

## 2. THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

The solution of this problem is very simple, and it is a significant fact that the same solution has been adopted in all modern armies. It is only necessary to provide that a man's army service shall consist of two periods, one period with the colors <sup>1</sup> and the other a period of war obligation for a limited time after leaving active service. Under these circumstances when war is declared the active army is at once sent into the field and the former soldiers having a war obligation are assembled in depots, where they can be forwarded to the front as

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<sup>1</sup> The period with the colors, or training period, should only be long enough to effect that purpose. The shorter this period the larger number of men pass annually into the reserves. To keep men with the colors after they have become trained, except as instructors, is both time and reserve personnel lost, provided sufficient recruits are obtainable to maintain always an adequate peace strength.

needed. At the same time raw recruits are enlisted and trained at the depot. As losses occur at the front they are filled first by forwarding trained men from the depot, and if the number of these is sufficient new recruits are not forwarded until after they have had a sufficient period of training. The result is that even in a long war, which would ultimately require the services of thousands of raw recruits, it is so arranged that no man goes to the front until he is trained for active service and sufficiently hardened and disciplined to bear the stress of modern war. Under such a system the full energy of military activity can be maintained up to the limit of available recruits. Each unit works at its maximum efficiency, and the war power of the nation is developed with a minimum expenditure of life and money.

This is not only sound military policy but sound economy, as it insures a reasonable preparedness for war, interferes to the least extent with the civil and industrial pursuits of the individual; in fact, sends him back to civil life a more valuable industrial factor because of his better physique, his improved mental and physical discipline, and with a greater respect for the flag, law and order, and his superiors. It is in accord with our institutions and ideals, in that it gives us the trained citizen soldier with the minimum of time taken from his industrial career. It keeps our officers alert and progressive and it gives us back of the first line, consisting of the Regular Army and the militia, a body of trained soldiers ready for immediate service, 10 of whom can be maintained for the cost of 1 man with the colors. In brief, short service and few reenlistments, except noncommissioned officers and a few skilled privates, with its concentrated progressive instruction and resulting passing through the Army and return to civil and industrial pursuits of as many men as possible, means preparedness for war at a minimum of expense and by means in accordance with our ideas. This principle has been carried out with the greatest success in Switzerland, where the available men of the country have undergone thorough military training with a minimum degree of interruption of their civil pursuits; here we have a population which is trained for war under conditions which afford a striking example of what can be accomplished by short service with the colors, thorough but concentrated instruction, and the return of the instructed man to his regular occupation, ready to respond whenever called upon. Long service with the colors, with the encouragement of reenlistment, means an army a large portion of which is serving for retirement and has passed the age of greatest physical activity and resistance. Its value as a field force has fallen off. At the same time, due to long service, the per capita cost is much greater than that of a short-term army, on account of the increase in the rate of pay. Most of the men who leave such a force do so because of disability or by

retirement for age. There is little or no material for a reserve. Such an army represents the maximum cost and a relatively low degree of efficiency; and the effect upon both officers and men is deadening, progress stops, and inertia results. This has been the history of long-service armies in all countries.

### 3. POWER OF EXPANSION.

But while one of the primary and necessary functions of a reserve system is to replace losses during the period required for the training of raw recruits, the principal function is to furnish the trained men necessary to pass from a peace to a war footing. If we have a reserve of trained men upon whom we can count in war, it is possible greatly to reduce the cost of the military establishment by giving it a minimum peace strength. Under our system our units are maintained in peace at considerably less than war strength, but there are no means of expanding to the war strength except by the absorption of untrained men. In every other modern army the economical peace strength is maintained without loss of war efficiency because trained reserves are available for a prompt expansion with trained men.

The effect of the reserve system on the cost of peace establishments can be illustrated in the following way: Let us suppose that we require a regular army of 100,000 men on the outbreak of war and that we propose to maintain this force in full effectiveness throughout the campaign. This requires that means should be provided for avoiding a deterioration of the force due to the absorption of raw recruits to replace the first losses of the campaign. It may be predicted that the losses will be 50 per cent, or 50,000 men, in the first six months, but before the expiration of six months, if we begin training recruits at once, some of the new men will be prepared to go to the front. We may, therefore, adopt a factor of safety of 25 per cent instead of 50 per cent and assume that the maintenance of 100,000 men will require an initial organized strength of 125,000 men if there be no reserves. Under conditions prevailing in the United States this force would cost probably \$800 per man, or \$100,000,000 per year.

But, if we had a system of reserves, the same effective war strength could be maintained at a greatly reduced cost. If the military establishment comprised 75,000 men with the colors and 50,000 men with the reserves, its cost would not exceed \$65,000,000 per year, and yet its war effectiveness would be just as great as the more expensive force without the reserves.

The economic effect of a reserve system, therefore, is to reduce the per capita cost of any given army, at the same time assuring maximum effectiveness in war. If we do not have reserves, we are committed

to a policy of maximum cost. It has been urged that a reserve system for the Regular Army is essentially foreign to our institutions and connected in some way with compulsory military service. It is true that the nations having a system of compulsory service also have a reserve system, but it is also true that Great Britain regards her regular army reserve as an indispensable part of her system of voluntary service. Great Britain did not adopt the reserve system until after her army broke down in the Crimean War because reserves were lacking. Her highly trained, long-service army almost immediately melted away. There was no way of renewing its strength except with untrained men. She found that without reserves her Army was not adapted to the requirements of war.

The provision of a regular army reserve is purely a business proposition. The economic value of the reserve does not depend in any way upon its size. It is to be hoped that we can develop a sufficient reserve, but even a small reserve will reduce the per capita cost of the Army and increase its effectiveness.

If we had had only 6,000 men, that number would have been sufficient to have raised the recent San Antonio maneuver division to war strength. If we should have enough to replace the initial losses of war, we would be assured of sufficient time to train and harden raw recruits before forwarding them to the front. If we should have enough more to give us some power of expansion, we would be able to reduce the per capita cost of our peace establishment to a minimum without loss of war efficiency.

The necessity for initiating steps for the provision of a reserve of officers qualified to serve as company officers of reserves or volunteers is also of great importance, and one which should receive the serious attention of the department. It is thought that it would be practicable to select from the graduating classes of those military schools where we have officers of the Army as military instructors and from selected men of the students military instruction camps lately organized 500 men each year, who could be commissioned as second lieutenants in the different line branches of the Regular Army for a period of one year, to receive the full pay and allowances of a second lieutenant, to be junior to all second lieutenants of the regular establishment, and to be discharged at the end of one year with a certificate of proficiency, if they merit it, as company, troop, or battery officers of volunteers or reserves. It is believed a proposition of this kind on the part of the Government would meet with a generous response and that it is a practicable way of providing a reserve of officers. The results obtained would justify the expense. It is not unlike the methods pursued in foreign countries to provide a corps of reserve officers. One thing is certain: We shall require

many thousands of officers, in addition to those of the regular establishment, as officers of volunteers and reserves in case of war, and steps should be taken to provide them in time of peace.

The great losses in the early periods of all our wars caused from sickness, lack of sanitary precautions, faulty tactics, etc., is chargeable directly to the inexperienced officers placed in command. It is of vital import to every mother and father of a young man as well as to the Nation, to provide means to remedy such a state of affairs before it is too late.

We are still without an adequate reserve system either of officers or men. Congress did, however, in the Army appropriation act of August 24, 1912, establish an Army reserve built upon an enlistment period of seven years, of which either three or four years, at the will of the soldier is spent with the colors. This is a great step forward, as it is the first time in the history of our country that the principle of reserves has been recognized.

Its principal defect, however, is the equal length or longer service period with the colors than in the reserve. This results in a greater length of time to accumulate a sufficient number and at the end of a certain period a fixed maximum obtains.

A much better division seems to be equal periods of three years each with the colors and in the reserves with the provision that a soldier may, if he so desires and with the certificate of his company commander that he is proficient, be discharged after the completion of one year's service (thus leaving five years in the reserves), thereby creating a growing reserve force.

The bounty now provided for by this same act in case of war to those who enlist is a most objectionable feature. It puts a premium on a discharged soldier not enlisting in the reserves and was proved to be most expensive and conducive to desertions when it was adopted during the Civil War.

This bounty system would not be necessary with adequate reserves provided for by proper laws.



## CONSIDERATIONS DETERMINING THE STRENGTH, COMPOSITION, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE LAND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

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1. Political conditions affecting our country have changed very materially in the past 20 years, but it can hardly be said that the development of our land forces has kept pace with these changing conditions. Until quite recently our people have been almost wholly occupied with the task of overrunning our continental possessions and taking full possession of them. The Regular Army has been the forerunner of this movement, and has been organized, distributed, and trained for the requirements thus involved. This has kept the bulk of the Regular Army scattered in small units in our western country. Conquest and settlement have been fairly completed now, however, and the civil authorities are capable of maintaining orderly conditions as well in one part of our country as in another. If domestic questions were still the only ones that claimed serious attention, it would seem that to deal with such questions only the Army should be distributed more equitably with respect to density of population.

But gradually our external problems have been assuming larger and larger proportion. While we were expanding other nations have been doing the like, and within the past few years it is found that practically the whole earth is now divided up among the principal nations and held by them either as actual possessions or as spheres of influence. Hitherto the interests of nations or of small groups of nations have been more or less local. But due to this worldwide expansion the contact between great nations and races has already become close. It tends to become continually closer, due to the increase of population and national needs, and due especially to the vastly increased facilities for intercommunication. With this close contact thus so recently established comes a competition—commercial, national, and racial—whose ultimate seriousness current events already enable us to gauge. Since our conflict with Spain in 1898 practically all of the principal nations of the earth have either been actively engaged in war or else brought to the verge of actual war. The evidence is clear that the nations and races capable of maintaining and protecting themselves are the only ones who can flourish in this world competition.

We have been drawn from our state of isolation and are inevitably involved in this competition. We must consider what preparation

we will make to meet this change in our national situation. It may be said that we claim the undisturbed enjoyment of our possessions at home and the protection of our interests abroad. Our military requirements may then be summed up as follows: (1) To secure our home country from invasion; (2) to protect our foreign interests; (3) to maintain domestic peace and good order. Our forces should be proportioned, organized, and trained to meet these requirements.

#### 1. ESTIMATE OF THE LAND FORCES NEEDED IN THE UNITED STATES.

Our requirements in the way of land forces are certain to change as the years go on, but in the light of present-day conditions it is estimated that at the outbreak of war with a first-class power we should be capable of mobilizing at once in the United States an effective force of 460,000 mobile troops and 42,000 Coast Artillery; that this is the minimum number of first-line troops necessary; and that to augment this force and replace its losses we should have plans made for raising immediately an additional force of 300,000 men.

To meet requirements less vital than a great national war—as, for example, the sending of expeditionary forces to protect certain foreign interests—it may be presumed that we would draw upon the forces thus enumerated; and as in the light of our recent experiences we can not possibly foretell to what places expeditions may have to be sent nor what numbers will be required, all of these forces should be available for service anywhere.

#### 2. REGULAR AND VOLUNTEER TROOPS.

The Regular Army contingent of this total mobile force at home should be sufficient to provide an expeditionary force capable of acting with the utmost promptness and decision, and sufficient to furnish a training nucleus for the volunteer troops in peace and a stiffening element in war. To meet conditions we can now foresee it is believed the Regular Army should comprise four complete divisions and that it should furnish as extradivisional troops a division of Cavalry and the quota of Heavy Field Artillery, Engineers, Signal, and sanitary troops appropriate for one field army. On this basis the regular contingent of mobile troops within the United States proper when raised to war strength would comprise about 112,000 men. The remaining 348,000 mobile troops would be made up of citizen soldiers organized in divisions and in field army auxiliaries.

The regular contingent of Coast Artillery troops in the United States should comprise 26,500 men when on war footing, leaving 21,000 to be furnished by the citizen soldiery. These figures are based on a complete regular personnel for mine companies and 50 per cent personnel of regulars for gun companies for authorized armament.

## A COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

As war is but a phase of international politics, so military policy is but a phase of international policy. In its broadest sense the organization of the land forces is but a part of the national war organization, which includes the organization of the sea forces and of all other national resources.

A scientific solution of our military problem must include a determination and definition of national policy, and the provision of sufficient military and naval forces to support that policy against such adverse interests as may develop from time to time. As several departments of the Government are concerned in the settlement of this question, it is obvious that a sound policy must be predicated upon a comprehensive view of the whole problem with the view of coordinating and balancing its several elements.

In order to formulate a comprehensive policy for the consideration of Congress, it is believed that there should be a council of national defense similar to the one proposed in H. R. 1309. The function of this council, as defined in the bill, is to "report to the President, for transmission to Congress, a general policy of national defense and such recommendation of measures relating thereto as it shall deem necessary and expedient."

The members of the council, as provided in the bill, are as follows:

The President of the United States (ex officio president of the council).

The Secretary of State (to preside in the absence of the President).

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of the Navy.

The chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

The chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate.

The chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate.

The chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

The chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives.

The chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

An officer of the Navy not below the rank of captain, to be selected by the Secretary of the Navy.

The president of the Army War College.

The president of the Navy War College.

It would seem that through the agency of this council the problem of national defense should receive the joint consideration of all of the branches of the Government which are responsible for its ultimate solution.

## LOCALIZATION OF REGIMENTS.

It has been indicated that the establishment of permanent foreign garrisons will permit localization of the units of the Regular Army at home. This will result in great economies of transportation and will lead to the development of many reforms which are almost impracticable so long as the organizations of the Army are shifted from place to place. The localization of the Army at home will facilitate the development of a reserve system, for where regiments are stationed in the populous parts of the country they will be able, in many cases, to keep in touch directly with their reserves, and also to obtain their recruits locally. The present recruiting system is based on recruiting for a shifting army. The service has been conducted with great ability and meets actual conditions, but it is wasteful and expensive as compared with a system of local recruiting for a localized army.

The dispersion was originally due to the necessity for establishing the many small posts, under whose protection has arisen the great empire west of the Alleghanies. Owing to the small size of our Army, and the system of peace-strength companies, it followed that in these posts only small garrisons were possible, and as these were charged not only with active operations against Indians in time of war, but the upkeep of the posts in time of peace, it is evident that the force available, and the character of their duties, prevented what may be called higher tactical training. This condition as regards training obtains to a great extent to-day, for while the necessity has passed for maintaining the posts, in so far as the Indian is concerned, another factor has developed which causes any attempt on the part of the War Department to abandon them to be met by a storm of indignation on the part of the inhabitants of near-by towns and cities. This factor is the money spent by the Government for the upkeep, and by the soldiers from their pay, which is an important item of local revenue; as a consequence an appeal is made to Congressmen and Senators, and in spite of what the War Department can do, the order goes forth that the post remain—so for political expediency a faulty and expensive system is perpetuated, and the Army continues to lack that training which can only be obtained by concentration in large units, where the higher problems of command and supply can be put in daily practice. More than this, it is not too much to say that the cost of the Army is increased one-tenth by the maintenance of these posts, distant in many cases from centers of supply, each with a complicated and expensive staff system.

## STUDENTS' MILITARY INSTRUCTION CAMPS.

1. In view of the great success of the two experimental military camps of instruction for students of educational institutions held during July and August of the past summer, the War Department has decided to repeat them in the ensuing year.

2. The object of the camp is, as before, to give to the young men of the country, who are desirous of accepting it, the opportunity for a short course in military training, in order that they may be better fitted to discharge their military duty to their country should it ever stand in need of their service. The time selected for these camps (summer vacation period) is intended to enable college men to attend with the least inconvenience and greatest instructional advantage to themselves.

3. In addition to the above patriotic motive of attendance, there are to be considered the physical benefits derived by the students from the active, healthful outdoor life of a military camp for the summer vacation, and this at less expense than is usually required when away from home. These physical benefits are of great and permanent value at this student period of their lives, when the pursuit of their studies during the balance of the year requires a certain amount of confinement. There are also the mutually broadening influences derived from meeting and being intimately associated with students of other well-known institutions, and the opportunity afforded for athletic training and contests, as well as the novelty of the experience itself, all contributing variety and interest to the program.

Another gain to the student is a certain increase in his economic value due to the increased business efficiency acquired through habits of discipline, obedience, self-control, order, command, and the study of organization and administration as applied in first-class modern armies.

4. The benefit of these camps to the Nation is that they foster a patriotic spirit, without which a nation soon loses its virility and falls into decay; they spread among the citizens of the country a more thorough knowledge of military history, military policy, and military needs, all necessary to the complete education of a well-equipped citizen in order that he may himself form just and true opinions on military topics.

As a military asset, the value of these camps is inestimable. They afford the means of materially increasing the present inadequate personnel of the trained or partially trained military reserves of the United States, and this increase consisting of a class of educated men

from which in time of national emergency a large proportion of the volunteer commissioned officers will probably be drawn, and upon whose judgment and training at such a time the lives of many other men will in a measure depend.

The ultimate object sought is not in any way one of military aggrandizement, but to provide in some degree a means of meeting a vital need confronting us as a peaceful and unmilitary people, in order to preserve the desired peace and prosperity through the only safe precaution, viz, more thorough preparation and equipment to resist any effort to break such peace.

5. Only those will be allowed to attend who are students in good standing of a first-class university, college, or in the graduating class at high or preparatory schools; recent university or college graduates, and those who have received a satisfactory official War Department certificate of attendance at a previous student camp.

Applicants must be citizens of the United States or have declared their intention of so becoming; 18 to 30 years of age, inclusive; of good moral character, and physically qualified.

6. Students must attend for the full period of five weeks, unless compelled by actual necessity to leave before that time. They must during this period render themselves subject to the rules and regulations prescribed for the government of the camp, the commanding officer having authority to discontinue their attendance, withhold, certificate or both, upon violation of such ordinances.

7. Students are required to pay for their transportation, food (\$3.50 per week), and clothing (about \$5).

The Government provides all the other necessities of camp life and the personnel for instruction.

The theoretical and practical principles of tactics are taught as well as target practice, map making, marching, camping, care of troops in the field, and camp sanitation, with talks by selected officers on field fortification, military bridge building, signalling, demolitions, the organization and supply of armies, and the military history of our country.

8. The camps will be held for five weeks between the early part of July and the middle of August, the exact dates to be decided upon later. This plan meets with the approval of all university and college authorities heard from on the subject, among whom are the heads of the majority of the larger educational institutions in the country.

It is heartily indorsed by the students attending last year's camp, the greater part of whom have expressed their intention of returning, if possible, in the coming year; and a number of congratulatory letters have been received from parents, dwelling upon the physical benefits derived by their sons from the last camp.

9. Applications for further information or to attend these camps, addressed to the War Department, will be given full consideration.

## STUDENTS' SOCIETY OF THE NATIONAL RESERVE CORPS.

1. The students attending the military instruction camps, as instituted by the War Department during the summer of 1913, formed an organization, for which they adopted the name the Society of the National Reserve Corps of the United States.

The following gentlemen, all of whom have expressed cordial interest in the plan of holding these summer camps, have consented to act as advisory committee of the student organization:

J. G. Hibben, president of Princeton University.

A. L. Lowell, president of Harvard University.

A. T. Hadley, president of Yale University.

G. H. Denny, president of the University of Alabama.

H. B. Hutchins, president of the University of Michigan.

E. W. Nichols, president of Virginia Military Institute.

B. I. Wheeler, president of the University of California.

J. H. Finley, president of the College of the City of New York.

H. S. Drinker, president of Lehigh University.

President Drinker was elected president of the organization.

Mr. George H. Gaston, jr., a student at the camp, was elected secretary and treasurer.

The following student-members of the camps were elected an executive committee:

H. A. Murrill, Virginia Military Institute.

C. D. Gentsch, Western Reserve University.

H. B. Perrin, Yale University (graduate).

F. R. Lowell, Yale University.

R. Guillou, University of California.

G. H. Gaston, jr., Princeton University.

2. At a meeting of the college presidents forming the advisory committee the following constitution, prepared by the students at the camps, was formally passed upon and adopted, viz:

### CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIETY OF THE NATIONAL RESERVE CORPS.

1. Being convinced of the physical benefit to be derived from living a part of the year in the strenuous, healthful, open-air life of a military camp, particularly to students whose pursuits have kept them indoors and leading a comparatively inactive life for considerable periods, and the knowledge gained of marching, camping, care of the person, and camp sanitation with minimum expense; and

2. Desiring to increase the economic value and business efficiency of our young men by giving them an opportunity to study the principles of command, organization and administration, and experience the value of discipline obtaining in modern armies; and



3. Realizing that wars between nations are liable to occur now or in the future, even as they have in the past; and

4. That notwithstanding our best efforts to preserve peace with right and honor our own country may become involved in a war, either of defense against attack or of offense against any nation that may violate the rights secured us under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States; and

5. Knowing the above and firmly believing that our present state of preparation and means of meeting such an emergency are inadequate and will lead either to disaster or to useless waste of men, material, and money; and

6. Further knowing that the above state of affairs should be remedied, and realizing that it is each man's duty to his country to do his own proper share to effect such a remedy;

7. We, the undersigned young men of America, do hereby form and organize the Society of the National Reserve Corps of the United States and do hereby pledge ourselves, individually and collectively, from purely patriotic motives, to do our utmost without hope of reward and without fear or favor to further the objects of said corps and work for its principles as set forth below:

The objects of the Society of the National Reserve Corps will be:

(a) To perpetuate the system of students' military instruction camps and to encourage a large attendance;

(b) To encourage thorough knowledge throughout the country of—

(1) Military policy,

(2) Military history, and

(3) Military organization—

and to have these objects included in the curriculum of the various colleges.

(c) To individually train ourselves to the best of our ability to be fitted to serve with best effect in case of need in such capacity as our condition at that time may properly permit.

(d) To establish and support a sound national military policy which shall include the maintenance of a highly efficient Regular Army sufficient for the peace needs of the Nation and a well-organized and efficient militia each supported by adequate reserves.


Eligible for membership:

*Class A.*—Those men who have attended one or more students' military instruction camps as organized by the War Department.

*Class B.*—All other citizens of the United States in good standing subject to rules and by-laws of the society.

3. It is believed that the above society has in it the seeds of a movement of great import to the Nation. The history of our country has ever been that what the people want they can get, and up to the present time their interest in a policy of an adequate national defense has not, either through lack of interest or force of necessity, been brought sufficiently to their notice.

4. It is believed that this society will help to accomplish this, and that the dissemination of their teachings through the medium of the educated youth of the country and by them to the citizens at large will produce the desired result.



### MANUAL TRAINING, ETC., IN THE REGULAR ARMY.

Several schemes have lately been proposed to institute in the Army schools of application for the learning of the various mechanical and industrial trades. This in addition to the purely military instruction and, as stated in the proposal, "to fill in the idle moments of a soldier's life."

These schemes all presuppose a continuance of the present policy of a long enlistment period with the colors and realize that the purely military training can be given in a shorter period, thereby leaving a considerable amount of available time, or else a repetition of instruction.

The proper policy, however, and as previously pointed out under "Reserves," is to stand for the avowed first purpose of an army, the establishment of an adequate defense of the Nation—an efficient Army, both regular and militia, each with its proper reserves—to effect which the enlistment period with the colors is cut down to the minimum amount necessary to learn the trade of a *soldier* and an intensive system of instruction established, it stands to reason there can in this case be but little time available for other purposes.

## MILITARY INSTRUCTION IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

1. Under section 1225, Revised Statutes, and amendments thereto, officers of the Regular Army are detailed as military instructors to certain schools, colleges, etc., that fulfill certain specified requirements as to number of students attending and amount of instruction given in military subjects.

Under the Morrill Act of July 2, 1862, certain land and money were donated—

“to the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college (in each State) where the leading subject shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and *including military tactics*, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts,” etc.

2. Under the present law there is no specified standard of military instruction required and no penalty attached to insufficient or improper military instruction that endangers the receipt of the annual fund appropriated, unless the following provision of the act of August 30, 1890, could be construed as such, viz:

“If the Secretary of the Interior shall withhold a certificate from any State or Territory (as to whether such State or Territory is entitled to receive its share of the appropriation for colleges) of its appropriation, the facts and reasons therefor shall be reported to the President, and the amount involved shall be kept separate in the Treasury until the close of the next Congress in order that the State of Territory may, if it should so desire, appeal to Congress from the determination of the Secretary of the Interior.


“If the next Congress shall not direct such sum to be paid, it shall be covered into the Treasury.

“And the Secretary of the Interior is hereby charged with the proper administration of this law.”

3. The Secretary of the Interior has not under him the necessary trained military personnel to determine, so far as the proper military instruction is concerned, whether or not the intent of the provisions of the Morrill Act regarding “military tactics” is properly enforced, and does not attempt to do so.

The War Department does inspect the several colleges to which Army officers are detailed, but has no remedy for the enforcement of the proper amount of military study other than the withdrawal of said officer in certain cases, the result being that in some colleges the minimum amount possible is set aside for the maintenance of the military department.

Efforts are now being made to remedy the above situation, and it is hoped the results will be satisfactory.



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